Self-organization, resources and strategies in a minority game by Ceva, Horacio
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/9
90
94
24
v1
  2
9 
Se
p 
19
99
Self-organization, resources and strategies in a minority game
Horacio Ceva∗
Departamento de F´ısica, Comisio´n Nacional de Energ´ıa Ato´mica,
Avda. del Libertador 8250, 1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina
(24 September, 1999)
Abstract
We find that the existence of self-organization of the members of a recently
proposed minority game, depends on the type of update rules used. The
resulting resource distribution is studied in some detail, and a related strategy
scheme is considered, as a tool to improve the understanding of the model.
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The emergency of organization inside a population can be the result of local interactions
between its members. This type of problems have been under study for a long time, and
can be schematically reduced, for instance, to an Ising-like model. A problem that has
recently become of interest is the self organization of a population without direct interactions
between its members, but with a feedback mechanism related with its collective behavior.
The minority game, introduced by Challet and Zhang [1], addresses one of the simplest
situations of this kind. In this model every member of a population has to choose from
a simple alternative, without knowing what the other members will do. Simple cases are:
to buy or sell in a stock market, to select one of two possible routes, etc. At the end of
the day, the winners are those ‘agents’ that happen to be in the minority side. Feedback
is established by a reward system for winners and losers. In more general terms, these
problems are nothing but simple examples of a situation where there is a competition for a
limited resource (money, food, free highways, etc.), and individual members of a population
adapt their behavior following their (recent) experiences. Arthur was the first to propose
this type of approach [2], in what now is known as the El Farol bar problem.
The specific form in which every member of the population makes his choise is generically
designated as his ‘strategy’. Different versions of the model are characterized by this strategy
selection. In this work we will address the model proposed by Johnson et al. [3]. As in all
minority games, there is an odd number of agents N , every one choosing between option
“0” (e.g. to buy an asset) and option “1” (to sell the asset). After all agents have made
their choise, the winners, i.e. those in the minority group, gain a point, while those in the
mayority group lose a point. A single binary digit, 0 or 1, signals the winner option. Each
agent knows beforehand the previous m outcomes of the game, as well as the outcomes of
the most recent occurrences (‘histories’) of all 2m possible bit strings of length m. Now,
Johnson et al. assign to each agent a single number p ( 0 ≤ p ≤ 1): given a history, the
agent will either choose the same outcome as that stored in the memory, with probability
p, or will choose the opposite with probability (1− p). Strategies can be modified, following
the evolution of the game. Thus, if an agent’s account is below a threshold value d < 0 ,
he gets a new strategy, whose value p′ is chosen with an equal probability from the interval
(p − r/2, p + r/2), where 0 ≤ r ≤ 2; in what follows we will use the simpler notation
p → p′ = p ±∆p. Simultaneously (and to some extent, arbitrarily), his account is reset to
zero. As we will discuss below, the existence of negative points, combined with the behavior
at the threshold, introduce some confusion at the time of considering the resources. In the
following, we will refer to this combinations as the d-rule.
The work of Johnson et al. has shown that, as a result of the correlations established by
those rules, agents self-organize, in such a way that the frequency distribution P (p) becomes
strongly peaked around both p ≃ 0 and p ≃ 1 (see curve R1 in Fig. 1).
Interesting as it is, this work leaves open some questions. First, it would be interesting to
check the robustness of self-organization, under changes in the strategy actualization rules.
As we will see, it also is of interest in this case to study with some detail the question of the
resulting distribution of the resources.
Our notation is as follows. A single realization of the game involves nt time steps.
All results are then averaged over ns different samples. The total amount of points to be
distributed in this process is T = N ∗ nt ∗ ns. We call n+ (n−) the number of positive
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(negative) points, i.e. those assigned to winner (loser) agents. Obviously, T = n+ + n−.
There is also certain amount of points, Nlost, that are eliminated from the game, namely
those assigned to any agent changing his strategy, p → p′. After all ns games are played,
there will be Nacc accumulated points, resulting simply from the sum of all accounts, at
the end of every game. Note that, in general, T > Nlost + Nacc, because there are both
positive and negative contributions to the accounts. Whenever necessary, we used reflective
boundary conditions.
We have made extensive numerical simulations, both with p→ p′ = p±∆p, the original
rule (≡ R1), and also with p→ p′ = (1−p)±∆p (rule R2), a seemingly minor modification
of the actualization rule for the strategies. In the latter case, any loosing agent will change
his mind and pick a ‘complementary’ strategy; in other words, if the initial selection was,
say, to choose preferentially option “0” then, after losing, the agent will rather prefer option
“1”. The resulting distribution functions are shown in Fig.1. Our results for R1 reproduce
(without noise) those of Johnson et al. It is apparent that there are important differences
between both cases: while self-organization shows up very clearly for R1, it is practically
absent in R2, which remains near to its initial (homogeneous) distribution [4]. This result
shows, apparently, that the presence of self-organization itself depends on the kind of strategy
employed.
Consider now the question of the distribution of available resources ( i.e. points). We
have already mentioned that every agent losing more than d points gets his account reset to
zero, whereby all those points leave the game. This introduces some confusion at the time
to interpret our results. The standard interpretation [1] only takes into account positive
points. I f we ignore for a moment the d-rule, ans simply consider all positive points added,
we found that the accumulated earning per time step, n+/T, is ≈ 0.47 in both cases, within
a small error. Notice that this is very near (N −1)/2N = 0.495, the maximum possible gain
with N = 101. The behavior of both cases, however, is also very different in this regard.
In fact, the distribution of positive points earned by an agent, C+(p), follows closely the
form of the corresponding P (p) shown in Fig.1, i.e. while earning is concentrated around
the extrema for R1, it is distributed for R2.
On the other hand, application of the d-rule modifies sensibly this interpretation. The
number of points earned by an agent with strategy p, C(p), is the algebraic sum of both
positive and negative points. Every time C(p) < d, all these points (positive and negative)
are discarded. At the end of all games, it is natural to choose the ratio G = Nacc/T as the
magnitude of interest. We find that G is always positive, but vanishes as T → ∞. In fact,
Nacc is proportional to both N and ns, and our results imply G ∼ 1/nt. Thus, for instance,
for ns = 500, and nt = 10
6, it already is G ≃ 0.00002. In other words, although there is
self-organization, as described by the work of Johnson et al., the net resources distributed
between all agents are vanishingly small. It is worth mentioning that this is not the result
of adding negative and positive accounts: in the mean they are mostly positive. Simply
enough, C(p) follows closely the behavior of P (p), but its magnitude vanishes in this limit.
A good amount of the points involved in the game turn out to be in Nlost and, what is more
important, Nlost ≃ n− − n+. This can be described by telling that in this case there are no
winners in the game [6]. This situation is still more pronounced in case one uses R2, the
alternative strategy rule.
In fact, it is only because the accounts are adjusted periodically to zero, that they appear
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to have mostly positive balance at the end of the games. In their study of this model,
D’hulst and Rodgers [5] used the Hamming distance between strategies and concluded that,
on average, the number of points earned by an agent, C(p, t), evolves with time t following
C(p, t) = −(
1
2
− τ(p)) (t− t0) (1)
until C < d, at which point is set equal to zero. In the above expression τ(p) < 1/2
and t0 are constants. This is a sawtooth function of t that is always negative, or vanishes.
This analysis, however, does not takes into account properly the role of the d-rule, as can
be seen in the following example. Consider a game where the winner is always the same
agent, while all others lose. After L time steps, the winner agent will have L points, while
the remaining (N − 1) agents will have −L each. Whenever −L < d, the d-rule implies that
only the winner keeps his points. Therefore, after a while, the net amount of points of all
players is necessarily positive.
We now turn our attention to a related type of strategy. Our main concern here is to
understand how we can improve the resource distribution, using rules similar to those of
Ref. [3].
Consider a rule p→ p′ which is intrinsically asymmetric (rule R3). In this case,
p′ = p0 ±∆p (2)
where 0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1 is constant.
Application of Eq.2 will move agents to the neihborhood of p0. Eventually, however,
there will be a majority of agents in this place, and therefore all others players will win,
establishing a stationary state. We want to know the dependence of G on p0, ∆p and r.
Note that it is possible to describe some cases p → p′ as a superposition of situations with
this type of update scheme. Figure 2(a) illustrates the case p0 = 0.8, r = 0.2. The resulting
frequency distribution is asymmetric. In this case there are winners, namely those agents
that manage to have their strategy below 0.5 The left side of Fig.2(a) shows the gain as a
function of p. In Fig.2(b), on the other hand, we have the gain G (i.e. the integral of that
shown in (a)) as a function of p0, for a fixed value of r.
ALso, and rather unexpectectly, we can see in Fig.3 that G is almost independent of
r, until it approaches r ≈ 1, where there is something analogous to a ‘phase transition’; it
probably corresponds to the ‘transition’ between localization around p0, and delocalization.
It should be emphasized that these results are associated with the use of the d-rule. Within
the standard interpretation, it can be seen that the gain increases with r, at least for r
smaller than ≈ 1.
Finally, it should be pointed out that, although the present version shares the main ideas
of the original minority game [1], in some respects it does not follows the same behavior.
Recent work [7] study the model of Callet and Zhang in terms of the variable α = P/N
(in our case, P = 2m), and the variance of the time series, σ2 =< (n− − n+)
2 > or, more
especifically, the reduced variance z ≡ σ2/N . As it is well known, the random agent case
is given by σ2 = N, i .e. z = 1. This value is attained for αr ≈ 0.2. Smaller values of α
produce a worst-than-random answer (z > 1), while the game output improves if α > αr
(z < 1). Moreover, they have identified two ‘phases’, characterized by the behavior of
z = z(α). For α < αc, the reduced variance decreases with α, but for α > αc it becomes an
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increasing function of α. Numerical simulations give the critical value αc ≈ 0.34 A theoretical
description of this game has been developed [7], based on an analogy with spin glasses. In
any case, it is apparent that, for fixed N , the response of the game is strongly dependent
with P (i.e. m in our case). We have not completed a systematic study in this respect, but
it is rather clear that the present model is, in fact, almost totally independent of the actual
value of m. On the other hand, we find z ≈ 0.04−0.08 for our three upgrade rules (although
α = 23/101 ≃ 0.08). This illustrates an important difference between both formulations.
This work was partially supported by EC Grant ARG/B7-3011/94/27, Contract 931005
AR.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Frequency distribution function for two different strategy actualization rules. R1:
p→ p′ = p±∆p; R2: p→ p′ = (1− p)±∆p . In both cases N = 101, nt = 10
5, ns = 10
4, d = −4,
m = 3, r = 0.2.
FIG. 2. Strategy rule p→ p′ = p0 ±∆p, N = 101, nt = 10
5, ns = 10
4, r = 0.2, d = −4, m = 3.
The line in (b) is only a guide to the eyes
FIG. 3. Strategy rule p → p′ = p0 ±∆p. nt = 10
5, ns = 500, N, d,m have the same values as
in Fig.2. Continuous lines are only a guide to the eyes.
7
0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
R2
R1
 
p
P(
p)
0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
(b)
r = 0.2
 
 
p0
G
 (%
)
0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8 (a)
p
ga
in
 p
er
 ti
m
e
 s
te
p
0
1
2
3
4
5
p0=0.8
 
P(
p)
1E-4 1E-3 0,01 0,1 1
0
5
10
15
20
 p0=1
 p0=0.8
 p0=0.3
 p0=0.5
 
 
r
G
 (%
)
